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The Question of Impeachment
By ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG*
No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment
should be continued. Shall any man be above justice?-George
Mason of Virginia during debate at the Constitutional Convention,
1787.
FOR good reasons, the American public is uneasy about the prospect
of impeaching the president. Impeachment leads to the most drastic
political sanction our constitutional system provides. To impeach
and convict the president is to remove from office our highest public
official elected by popular vote. An impeachment proceeding, it is
feared, may produce bitter divisions in the country and shatter confi-
dence in our institutions and ourselves.
The men who framed our Constitution were aware of the enor-
mity of the impeachment sanction and recognized the potentially dis-
ruptive effects of an impeachment proceeding.' But they also recog-
nized that it would be more dangerous for the country to have no
remedy against betrayal of the public trust than to have the impeach-
ment procedure.2
We must not, if the circumstances warrant, abjure the use of the
sanction the Framers provided. But precisely because the stakes are
so high for all of us, we must assure that the impeachment process
is, in fact, a fair and principled one, legitimate in the eyes of the peo-
* Former Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court.
1. Alexander Hamilton wrote in THE FEDERALisT No. 65 at 424 (modem Li-
brary ed. 1941) that "The prosecution of [impeachment] ...will seldom fail to agi-
tate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less
friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest
on the one side or on the other." See also 2 THE RlcoRns oF TnE FEDERAL CON-
VENnTON 612-613 (M. Farrand ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as Farrand]. A motion
"that persons impeached be suspended from their office until they be tried and acquit-
ted" was defeated by a vote of eight states to three states.
2. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 64-69. A motion that "the Executive be remove-
able on impeachments" was approved by a vote of eight states to two states.
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ple. That responsibility, at least for now, rests with the Judiciary
Committee of the House of Representatives.'
The most basic question the Committee must decide is also the
most difficult one: What is an impeachable offense? Article II, sec-
tion four of the Constitution provides that "The President, Vice Presi-
dent, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed
from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bri-
bery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors." The first two are
well-recognized criminal offenses. 4 But the term "high Crimes and
Misdemeanors" is not defined, and other constitutional references to
impeachment, are ambiguous on the question whether "high Crimes
and Misdemeanors" was meant to encompass more than criminal of-
fenses.'
However, in its historical context, the term had particular mean-
ing for the Framers. "High Crimes and Misdemeanors" is first en-
countered in a series of political impeachments through which the
English Parliament fought the absolutist claims of the Crown.' Im-
peachment was a political process employed -to check what Parliament
felt were abuses of power committed by the king or his ministers.1
3. By a vote of 410 to four, the House of Representatives on Feb. 6, 1974, "au-
thorized and directed" the House Judiciary Committee "to investigate fully and com-
pletely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise
its constitutional power to impeach Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States
of America." H.R. Res. 803, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REc. H526 (daily ed.
Feb. 6, 1974).
4. Treason against the United States is defined in the U.S. CONsT. art. Ii, §
3 as "levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid
and Comfort." This language has been statutorily adopted in 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1970)
which provides "[wlhoever, owing allegiance to the United States, levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States
or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall be imprisoned not
less than five years and fined not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding
any office under the United States." Bribery is not defined in the Constitution, and
in fact was not made a federal crime until 1790 for judges (Act of Apr. 30, 1790,
ch. 9, § 21, 1 Stat. 117), 1853 for members of Congress (Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch.
81, § 6, 10 Stat. 171), and 1864 for other civil officers (Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch.
76, § 6, 12 Stat. 740). The relevant statutory provisions are now contained in 18
U.S.C. § 201(c) and (g) (1970).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (judgment shall not extend further than removal from
office and disqualification to hold office, but does not provide immunity from criminal
prosecution); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (no right to trial by jury); and U.S. CONST.
art. 11, § 2 (exempt from power of pardon).
6. See generally R. BERGER, IwnAcHmENT: Tin CONsrrrtrrioNAL PROBLEMS 67-
72 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as BERGER]. The phrase first appears in 1386 during
the impeachment of the Earl of Suffolk, the King's Chancellor.
7. BERGER, supra note 6, at 67-72.
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As the Framers inherited "high Crimes and Misdemeanors," the
phrase was not tied to violations of the criminal law.8 But it did in-
volve grave abuses of official power and serious attempts or acts to
subvert the Constitution. Several of the Framers assured delegates
to state ratifying conventions that a president could be impeached only
upon the commission of "great offenses" or "acts of great injury to
the community." Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist that
impeachment would arise out of the "abuse or violation of some public
trust.110  George Mason referred to "attempts to subvert the Consti-
tution.""1 What emerges from the history of this vaguely-defined
phrase is the conclusion that impeachment proceedings against a presi-
dent are suitable only for great offenses against the state which, while
not necessarily criminal in nature, constitute a betrayal of the public
trust undermining the integrity of the government and the Constitu-
tion. I agree therefore with the conclusion reached by the dis-
tinguished counsel of the House Judiciary Committee 2 that the presi-
dent may be impeached for offenses which are not necessarily crimes
under the criminal codes.
To assign responsibility for such offenses, however, personal in-
volvement on the part of the president is necessary. For example,
if the president is involved in the commission or cover-up of his sub-
ordinates' serious criminal acts or attempts to subvert the Constitution
-if, in James Madison's words, he is "connected, in any suspicious
manner with any person, and there be grounds to believe that he will
8. Significant is the impeachment of Warren Hastings, first Governor-General
of India, pending before Parliament during the Constitutional Convention. Hastings
was charged with high crimes and misdemeanors in the form of gross maladministra-
tion, corruption in office and cruelty toward the people of India. See generally MAR-
SHALL, THE IMPEACHMENT OF WARREN HASTINGS (1965). George Mason, who pro-
posed the inclusion of "high crimes and misdemeanors" in the impeachment clause, di-
rectly referred to the Hastings impeachment during the Convention debates. 2 Far-
rand, supra note 1, at 550. Alexander Hamilton later stated that Great Britain was
"[tihe model from which [impeachment] has been borrowed." He described the pa-
rameters of impeachment as "those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of pub-
lic men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They
are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to society itself." Tim FEDERAL sT,
No. 65 at 423-424 (Modem Library ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
9. See generally J. ELLIOT, Tim DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF Tim FEDERAL CONSTrToN (1881), [hereinafter cited as ELaT].
10. Tim FEDERALIST No. 65 at 423 (Modem Library ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
11. 2 Farrand, supra note 1, at 550.
12. STAFF OF HOUSE Commi. ON THE JuDicARY, 93D CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON
CoNSTIUTIONAL GRouNDs FOR PRESIDENTAL IMPEACHMENT 26-27 (Comm. Print
1974) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
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shelter him '13 -that action would constitute an impeachable offense.
But if the persons the president chose to advise him subverted our
constitutional system without his knowledge or against his will, he is,
like Shakespeare's Lear, "a man more sinn'd against than sinning."14
This is not to say that the president can escape his duty to see
to it ithat the laws are faithfully executed. 5 Gross neglect of such
duty may properly be deemed an impeachable betrayal of the public
trust. The president must mind the store and this necessarily encom-
passes appropirate supervision of the activities of his high-ranking sub-
ordinates to whom he delegates important responsibilities.
A threshold question in the Watergate and related scandals is:
Can a president be indicted while in office? History offers no clear
answer. The Constitution merely provides that "Judgment in Cases
of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office
. . . but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject
to Indictment, Trial Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law."'
Judges have been indicted while in office.17  No specific constitutional
provision indicates that the president, unlike any other citizen, is im-
mune from criminal sanctions.
But, as always, the Constitution must be interpreted in light of
the general structure of government it contemplates. Such an inter-
pretation compels the conclusion that the president is the exception
who cannot be indicted while in office. Our federal system can func-
tion with a judge serving a prison term. Other federal judges can
replace them. But the president is uniquely powerful and essential:
he is the official who under the Constitution commands the armed
forces,' 8 formulates foreign policy,' 9 appoints judges,20 and presides
13. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 9, at 498.
14. King Lear, Act IIL Scene 11, Line 59.
15. The duty he assumes when he takes his oath of office set forth in U.S.
CONST. art M, § 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art I, § 3.
17. The most recent example is Otto Kerner, who was appointed as a judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals in 1968. Judge Kerner was indicted in December of 1971
for bribery, perjury, conspiracy, mail fraud and income tax evasion in connection with
a secret purchase and sale of race track stock while he was Governor of Illinois. Judge
Kerner was convicted on Feb. 19, 1973, and sentenced to three years in federal prison
and a $50,000 fine on Apr. 19, 1973. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1973, at 11, col. 5. Judge
Kerner took a leave of absence from the bench after his conviction, and requested that
his salary be held in escrow pending appeal of his conviction. N.Y. Times, May 10,
1973, at 27, col. 8.
18. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2.
20. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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over the executive branch of government.21
The president can only be imteached by one institution-the
Congress 2 2-which is directly accountable to the people. Prosecutor-
ial harassment and physical detainment, before conviction by the Sen-
ate after impeachment is voted by the House, are incompatible with
the unique functions of the chief executive. Apparently, Special
Prosecutor Jaworski is of the same mind and so advised the Watergate
Special Grand Jury.
The president's immunity from indictment before conviction by
the Senate and removal from office increases the burden on the Judi-
ciary Committee. For this reason, it is imperative that the House Ju-
diciary Committee be supplied with all relevant information and evi-
dence bearing on the president's case, including the grand jury re-
port. 23  Precautions can and should be taken under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure to prevent prejudicial pre-trial publicity which
could jeopardize the indictments of secondary figures. Even if some
indictments are in fact jeopardized, there is an overriding need to fully
air and judge the president's case in the present circumstances.
The president, too, must take part in this full disclosure-that
is his constitutional duty. Article I, section two of the Constitution
provides that the House of Representatives "shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment." The House is thus authorized to investigate the
conduct of the president. Considering the gravity of its task, the
House's powers to obtain information are even greater than a grand
jury's. The House in an impeachment proceeding is indeed the great
inquest of the nation. For the president to assert executive privilege
in refusing to turn over material relevant to the impeachment investi-
gation would be tantamount to defying the constitutional scheme of im-
peachment. The president has no executive privilege in matters per-
taining to impeachment, and continued resistance to the House's rele-
vant inquiries would in itself constitute an impeachable offense. But,
of course, the House's inquiries must be relevant to the question of
the commission of an impeachable offense.
The president is not left defenseless through the course of im-
peachment. The Judiciary Committee can only recommend; the
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides that the House of Representatives "shall
have the sole Power of Impeachment," and U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3 states that "[tthe
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments:'
23. On March 18, 1974, Judge Sirica ruled that the grand jury report should be
turned over to the House Judiciary Comm. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 1, col. 8.
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House of Representatives must by a majority vote impeach, which,
in constitutional terms, is akin to a finding, not of guilty, but of prob-
able cause. The Senate only can convict, and a two-thirds vote is
required.24 And conviction can only take place after a senatorial trial
with the Chief Justice of the United States presiding. 5 The Consti-
tution provides in Article I, section three that the Senate. has "the
sole Power to try all Impeachments." In The Federalist, Hamilton
refers to the Senate in their judicial character as a court "for the trial
of impeachments." 26  "Trial" has real meaning for both lawyer and
layman. During an impeachment proceeding, when his great office
is at stake, the president is entitled to the right to counsel, the oppor-
tunity to be heard and to face opposing witnesses, and the other funda-
mental elements of a fair trial.
The Andrew Johnson impeachment has been repudiated by his-
tory largely because the Senate persisted in ignoring the president's
procedural rights. After the Senate convened, for example, defense
counsel requested thirty days to prepare for trial; the Senate allowed
only six.2 When the Senate proceeds in such a manner, it exceeds
its constitutional authority to try the president.
Although the Constitution authorizes the Senate to try all
impeachments, it does not provide a blank check for the Senate to
exceed constitutional boundaries by denying procedural due process.
It is almost inconceivable that after a senatorial conviction, a presi-
dent would contest it in the courts. Such a course might well result
in irreparable damage to the body politic. There is a debate, how-
ever, among constitutional experts as to whether the president could
challenge an impeachment conviction in the Supreme Court. In my
opinion, he could but only on the ground that he was denied proce-
dural due process or convicted of a non-impeachable offense. I re-
gard the 1969 case of Powell v. McCormack2 s as a relevant Supreme
Court precedent. Adam Clayton Powell was a New York Congress-
man excluded from the House for. "serious misconduct.' 29  The Con-
stitution provides that the House shall be the sole judge of its mem-
bers' qualifications and further enumerates the qualifications each rep-
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
25. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
26. Tim FEDERALisT No. 65 at 423 (Modem Library ed. 1941) (A. Hamilton).
27. TRiAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 23 (3 Vols., U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1868).
28. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
29. H.R. Res. 278 as amended, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 113 CONG. REc. 5039
(1967).
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resentative must meet.3 0  None of those qualifications pertained to
the charges against Powell.31 The fact that the House is designated
sole judge of its members' qualifications did not prevent the Court
from setting aside Powell's exclusion, for the House had abused its
power in barring Powell for a shortcoming not specified in the Con-
stitution.3 2
Congress is empowered to impeach and remove a president who
has committed treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemean-
ors. Yet one of the articles of impeachment against Andrew Johnson
-Article X-charged, essentially, that in various speeches he had at-
tempted to bring Congress into disgrace.33 Article X was not only,
as Professor Berger observes, "a brazen assault on the right freely
to criticize the government;"34 it involved neither treason nor bribery
nor a high crime or misdemeanor. Had Johnson been convicted of
the charges made in Article X, it would have been proper, in my
opinion, for the Supreme Court to have set aside that conviction on
appeal. Otherwise, Congress' violation of the Constitution would have
survived unchecked.
The impeachment process was abused at the Johnson trial. It
is imperative, as we face the possibility of impeaching a president for
only the second time in our history," that Congress proceed consti-
tutionally. Impeachment cannot solve all of our Watergate woes; but
if impeachment proceedings are properly and fairly conducted, the
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 5, 2.
31. 395 U.S. at 492.
32. 395 U.S. at 512-549.
33. Article X alleged that Johnson, "unmindful of the high duties of his office
and the dignities and proprieties thereof, . . . designing and intending to set aside the
rightful authority and powers of Congress, did attempt to bring into disgrace, ridicule,
hatred, contempt, and reproach, the Congress of the United States, [and] to impair
and destroy the regard and respect of all good people. . . for the Congress and legisla-
tive power thereof.. . [by making] certain intemperate, inflammatory, and scandalous
harangues." For the full text of the articles, see CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1603-18 (1868).
34. BERGER, supra note 6, at 274.
35. President Johnson was acquitted by vote of 35 guilty, 19 not guilty, one vote
short of the two-thirds required to convict. CoNG. GLOBE SupP., 40th Cong., 2d Sess.
415 (1868). Since 1787, Thirteen U.S. officials have been impeached by the House
of Representatives: Senator William Blount (1797), District Judge John Pickering (1803)
Justice Samuel Chase (1804), District Judge James Peck (1830), District Judge West
Humphreys (1862), President Andrew Johnson (1867), District Judge Mark Delahay
(1873), Secretary of War William Belknap (1876), District Judge Charles Swayne
(1903), Circuit Judge Robert Archibald (1912), District Judge George English (1925),
District Judge Harold Louderback (1932), and District Judge Halstead Ritter (1933).
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result, whatever it may be, will stand as legitimate in this nation and
through the world.
The Constitution provides the tools; our reluctance to use tools
so finely honed is understandable. But they are in use. The im-
peachment process is underway. It is the duty of Congress to proceed
to a conclusion; it is the duty of the president to cooperate with the
Congress. It is the duty of the people to abide by the result. This
is our constitutional way. We must uphold and defend it.
